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QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following questions are presented in this appeal:
1.

Did

the District

Court

err

in granting

summary

judgment in favor of Sellers on Buyers' claims for fraud in the
inducement and negligent misrepresentation in the business purchase
transaction when Sellers warranted and represented to Buyers in the
purchase contract:
With knowledge, and buyer may rely on the same
to enter into this transaction. . . . That
there
are
no
known
. . .
litigation
proceedings against seller . . . ,
and Sellers admitted they knew of pending litigation at the time of
sale and intentionally failed to disclose that fact to Buyers?
2.
judgment

in

Did

the District

favor of

Broker

Court

err

on Buyers'

in granting
claims

for

summary

fraud

and

negligent misrepresentation in the business purchase transaction
when there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that
Broker induced Sellers to not disclose pending litigation and to
warrant and represent "[t]hat there are no known. . . litigation
proceedings against the seller"?
3.

Did

judgment

on

contract

when

the District

Sellers'
Sellers

Court

counterclaim
represented

err

in granting

for breach

of

the

purchase

to

in

the

purchase

Buyers

contract:
With knowledge, and buyer may rely on the same
to enter into this transaction. . . . That
there
are
no
known
. . .
litigation
proceedings against seller . . . ,

1

summary

and Sellers admitted they knew of pending litigation at the time of
sale and intentionally failed to disclose that fact to Buyers?
4.

Did

the District

Court

err

in granting

summary

judgment on Broker's counterclaim for attorney fees pursuant to
indemnity

provision

in

the

purchase

contract

when

there

was

evidence that Broker knew about the existence of pending litigation
in violation of the express representation in the purchase contract
and induced the Sellers not to disclose that fact to Buyers?
In reviewing this appeal from the lower court's granting
of

summary

judgment

motions

against

Buyers,

all

facts

and

reasonable inferences therefrom are to be drawn in Buyers' favor,
and the trial court's ruling is accorded no deference.

E .g. , Blue

Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989);
Neiderhauser Builders. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193,
1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellants Donald M. Dudley and Ruf, Inc. appeal from
final judgments of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County,

Honorable

Stephen

L.

Henriod,

entered

on motions

for

summary judgment in favor of Appellees Iceland Investment, Inc.,
Robert Johnson, and VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers.

This

Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-3 (j) (1997) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts.1

1.

On or about September 12, 1990 Appellants Ruf, Inc.

as buyer and Donald M. Dudley as guarantor (hereinafter "Buyers")
agreed to purchase the assets of a business from Appellee Icelandic
Investments, Inc. f/k/a USA Swings for a total purchase price of
$82,546.00 (hereinafter "Purchase Transaction").
2.
Icelandic

Appellee

Robert

Investments,

Inc.

collectively "Sellers").
3.
(hereinafter

Johnson
f/k/a

was

USA

the

Swings

president

of

(hereinafter

[Rl, 21 & 80]

Defendant VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers
"Broker")

is a brokerage

firm which brokered

transaction between the buyers and sellers.
received

[R2 & 10-60] 2

[Rl-2 & 71]

the

Broker

$10,452 in commission at the closing of the Purchase

Transaction.
4.

[R434 at U 10]
The Purchase Transaction was memorialized in the

Agreement for Sale of Assets, dated September 12, 1990 (hereinafter
"Purchase Transaction Agreement")
inter alia, Icelandic

[R10-60] which was signed by,

Investments, Inc., Ruf, Inc., Donald M.

Dudley, and Robert Johnson, individually.

[R21]

1

As this is an appeal from the lower court's granting of
summary judgment motions against Buyers, all facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom are to be drawn in Buyers' favor. E.g., Blue
Cross Sc Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989);
Neiderhauser Builders. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193,
1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2

All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk
of the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3

5.

In connection with the Purchase Transaction it was

expressly represented:
The SELLER warrants and represents to BUYER
with knowledge, and BUYER may rely on the same
to enter into this transaction each and all of
the following:
5.
That
there
are
no
known
governmental,
administrative, or litigation proceedings against SELLER,
which have arisen in connection with its conduct of the
business.
[R4, 15-16, 436] (emphases added)
6.

This representation was material to Buyers because,

inter alia, their financing source for purchase and operation of
the business was contingent on there being no litigation against
the business.
7.

[R5-7, 853-854, 864-870, 1167-1172]
This representation was false. Before entering into

this Purchase Transaction, Seller Icelandic had been made a party
to litigation brought by Associated Factors, Inc. and captioned
Associated Factors, Inc. v. Rainbow Custom Fibers, et al. , Civil
No. 87-02843, pending in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
County

(hereinafter "Associated Factors Lawsuit").

830, 1565]

[R435, 742,

Associated Factors was seeking to recover from Seller

Icelandic the sum of $88,798.50 plus punitive damages, interest and
attorney's fees.
8.

[R438]

Appellee Johnson knew about the Associated Factors

Lawsuit pending against the Seller Icelandic and told Broker about
the litigation prior to the Purchase Transaction.
at n. 1,

831, 1553]

4

[R435-436, 742

9.

Neither Seller Icelandic nor Mr. Johnson disclosed

the pendency of the Associated Factors Lawsuit to Buyers and Buyers
were

not

aware

Transaction
Agreement.

and

of

the

the

lawsuit

at

execution

of

the

time

the

of

the

Purchase

Purchase

Transaction

[R4, 439, 742, 830]
10.

Broker

did

not

disclose

the

pendency

of

the

Associated Factors Lawsuit to Buyers and, in fact, Broker persuaded
the Seller Icelandic and Appellee Johnson not to disclose the
pendency of the litigation.

[R742, 831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250,

1360-1363]
11.

Buyers

did

not

learn

litigation until the following year.

of

the

[R743]

pendency

of

the

On October 10, 1991

Buyer Ruf, Inc. was named in an amended complaint by Associated
Factors seeking recovery from Ruf in the amount of $88,798.50 plus
punitive damages, interest and attorney fees.

[R831, 864-894]

The

amount sought in this litigation was more than the entire purchase
price in the Purchase Transaction Agreement.
12.

[R10-12]

Revelation and disclosure of the

lawsuit

caused

Buyers to lose their funding source, and a funding commitment of
$150,000.00.
13 .

[R5, 853-856, 864-869]
Upon learning they had been defrauded with regard to

litigation against the business, the Buyers on September 23, 1991
sent

Sellers

Transaction.

a written

notice

of

[R438, 628, 868]

5

rescission

of

the

Purchase

14.

On November 11, 19 91 Buyer Ruf, Inc. , by and through

its counsel, filed an Answer to the Associated Factors' Complaint.
[R868, 895-899]
15.
demand

and

In June 1992, eight months after the rescission

more

than

a year

and

a

half

after

the

transaction, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was settled.

purchase
[R744,

900-902]
B.

The Nature of the Case And The Course Of
Proceedings And Disposition In The Lower Court.

1.

Claims and Counterclaims

-- Buyers v. Broker.

On July 21, 1993, Buyers brought this action against
Broker asserting causes of action for Fraudulent
Contract

and

Negligent

Misrepresentation.

Inducement to

[Rl-9]

Broker

counterclaimed against Buyers asserting that Buyers breached the
indemnity provision

contained

Transaction Agreement.

in paragraph XX of the

[R74-75, 82-84]

Purchase

Buyers, in their Answer to

Broker's counterclaim on September 22, 1993, affirmatively asserted
as their third defense:
Any indemnification agreement signed by [Buyers] is
subject to rescission given the conduct of [Sellers and
Broker] as alleged in the Complaint, which allegations
are hereby incorporated by reference as a further
affirmative defense. [R96]
2.

Claims and Counterclaims

-- Buyers v. Sellers

Buyers also brought claims against Sellers for Fraudulent
Inducement to Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of
Contract.

[Rl-9]

Sellers in turn counterclaimed against Buyers

for $46,545.74, the unpaid portion of the sales price under the
6

Purchase Transaction Agreement.
Sellers'

counterclaim

[R79-84]

In their Answer to

Buyers' again affirmatively

asserted

the

following:
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is
subject to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers
and Broker] as alleged in the Complaint which is
incorporated by this reference. [R93]
3.

Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment.

On October 18, 1995, Broker moved the trial court for
summary judgment on the grounds that Buyers expressly assumed by
contract the risk of their damages, that Buyers released Brokers as
to liability and that Buyers agreed not to sue Brokers for any
damages resulting from the purchase of the business.

[R234-35]

Buyers responded to the motion for summary judgment and set forth
evidence and argument that:
negligent misrepresentation;
fraudulent inducement;

3)

1)

Broker was liable to Buyers for

2)

Broker was liable to Buyers for

The contract provision relied on by

Broker should not be applied to exculpate Broker from its own
fraud; and

4)

to rescission.

The contract is voidable and Buyers were entitled
[R431-449]

Broker's three-page argument filed on

reply argued that Buyers failed to show a prima facie case of
intentional or negligent misrepresentation and raised, for the
first time, the argument that Buyers have not shown any damages to
support their claims.
On

February

[R495-500]
24,

1997,

Broker's

Motion

Judgment came on for hearing before the trial court.

for

Summary

On February

26, 1997 the trial court issued its Minute Entry wherein it granted
7

Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In granting the Broker's

summary judgment the trial court ruled in its Minute Entry3 as
follows:
[Broker's] Motion for Summary Judgment is based primarily
on paragraph XX of the contract between the parties.
Article XX says in pertinent part that buyer is relying
solely on buyer's inspection of the business and the
representations of the seller, and not on [broker's] with
regard to the prior operating history of the business,
the value of the assets being purchased, and all other
material facts of seller in making this offer.
The
paragraph goes on to state that the broker hasn't
verified and will not verify any representations of
seller and if any representation should be untrue, buyer
agrees to look solely to seller for relief, and to
indemnify [broker] and hold broker harmless in connection
with any losses or damages caused to buyer.
In its response, the [buyer] seems to ignore the
foregoing contractual provision, claiming that the
[buyer] would not have entered into the contract, but for
negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations by the seller
and [broker], and that therefore [buyer] is entitled to
rescission and the terms of the contract don't matter.
The [buyer's] arguments have no merit for several
reasons. The agreement was signed by all the parties.
The [buyer] testified in his deposition that he read the
agreement thoroughly and understood it. [Buyer] , through
paragraph XX, expressly assumed the risks regarding
representations or misrepresentations of seller. By this
provision, [buyer] expressly relieved [broker] of any
legal duties arising from the described conduct, i.e.,
seller's representations or misrepresentations.
. . . The [buyer] has simply failed to [show there is a
genuine issue for trial]. With respect to the elements
of fraudulent misrepresentation, there is no factual
averment from the [buyer] establishing even arguable
evidence of each of those elements. The same is true
with
respect
to
the
elements
of
negligent

3

The Minute Entry is quoted herein as the trial court's
Order, signed April 25, 1997, simply provides that "Defendant
[Broker's] Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons
set forth, in the detail, [sic] in the Court's Minute Entry dated
February 26, 1997."
[R693-695]
8

misrepresentation.
[Buyer] has also failed to provide
any evidence of damages.
[Buyer's] action against [Broker] is barred by the terms
of the contract, and [Buyers] have failed to meet their
burden in response to [Broker's] Motion for Summary
Judgment.
[R603-607]4
4.

Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment.

On May 9, 1997, Sellers moved the trial court for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of Buyers' claims against Sellers and
judgment on Sellers' counterclaim.

[R739-740]

Sellers' Motion,

while conceding the misrepresentation and nondisclosure of the
pending litigation, argued they were entitled to summary judgment
on two grounds:

(1)

They were not provided with a written notice

of default with a 3 0-day opportunity to cure as set forth in
Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement; and (2)
was no damage to Buyers resulting

There

from the misrepresentation.

[R740-749]
In opposition to Sellers' summary judgment motion, Buyers
submitted the affidavits of Donald M. Dudley and Wesley C. Dudley.
[R864-870 & 853-857, respectively] . Donald Dudley testified, inter
alia, that the lack of outstanding litigation against Sellers was
extremely important to him and that he would not have entered into
the Purchase Transaction Agreement or signed the promissory notes
if that warranty was not in the agreement.
12]

He

testified

further

that

upon

[R866-867 at HU 4-6 &

disclosing

the

existing

litigation against the business to Wesley Dudley, who was financing
4

Attached as Addendum "A".
9

the purchase and operation of the business and was Donald Dudley's
only viable source of financing, Wesley Dudley refused to advance
any further funds to finance the purchase or operation of the
business and no other financing was available.
& 10]

[R866-867 at %^ 9

Likewise, Wesley Dudley testified that he had required, as

a condition to financing the business, that there be no litigation
against the business.

[R855 at K 8]

He further testified that

upon learning of the pending litigation against the business he
would not loan any additional funds to Donald Dudley, and had there
not been any litigation he was ready, willing and able to loan the
additional $150,000 in capital he had committed to loan for the
purpose of operating and expanding the business.

[R855 at ^

6-

10] 5
On October 20, 1997 the trial court entered an Order
granting
complaint

Sellers1
and

summary

granting

judgment

judgment

motion

against

counterclaim in the amount of $89,006.31.

dismissing
Buyers

on

[R1060-1062]

Buyers1
Sellers1
While the

trial court ! s written order does not explain or set forth the
court's reasoning or basis for its ruling, the court's ruling from
the bench on August 4, 1997 explained it as follows:

5

Although Sellers never objected to the affidavits, Broker
moved to strike these affidavits to the extent they pertained to
the motion for new trial discussed below arguing that Buyers were
"unreasonably
dilatory
in preparing
and
submitting
these
Affidavits".
[R924-929] There was no evidentiary challenges to
the affidavits or their contents.
On August 6, 1997 the trial
court granted this motion and struck the affidavits as they pertain
to the motion for new trial. The trial court did not, however,
strike them with respect to Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment
and no such motion was ever made. [R1021-1025]
10

And
granted.

[Sellers']

motion

for

summary

judgment

is

And I think this was explained very well by Mr.
Slaugh. When a party makes a motion for summary judgment
and it is properly supported, the burden on the
responding party is a lot greater than what [Buyers] have
met in their response.
When I said wishy-washy, Mr. Silvestrini
-- and
that's really what I was talking about
-- Mr. Slaugh
talked about clear and convincing evidence. It is clear
to me from reading the affidavits and deposition that Mr.
Dudley did not rely on it.
He likes to talk about
reliance, but he's got to bring to court admissible facts
showing that we've got a case to try. . . . And the fact
[sic] that the [Buyers] needed to bring to this Court to
survive these motions simply were never even proffered.
And that's absolutely true with the damage issue. That
was raised. That was before the Court. And there hasn't
been even an intimation regarding the kind of specific
types of damages that would have to be raised again to
survive this motion. [Buyers have] simply failed to make
even a prima facie case of fraudulent inducement.
It
takes more than just evidence in the record.
I think the contract provision regarding notice and
cure is essential to any analysis of this case, and it is
also clear that the [Buyers] completely ignored that
provision.
That provision was there for exactly this
kind of case. And I think that cut right to the core for
the argument for fraudulent inducement.
Why is this
provision in the contract if the parties didn't
acknowledge
that
there
are
sometimes
things
misrepresented, omitted or even things that people don't
know about that are not as everybody thought they were
when they put together the list of representations at the
start of a contract?
[R1004] (emphases added) 6
5.

Buyers' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.

On February 25, 1997, prior to the Sellers' Motion for
Summary Judgment and prior to the trial court's decision granting
Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment, Buyers moved the trial court

Attached as Addendum "B".
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for leave to amend their complaint

to add a claim for relief

entitled "rescission and restitution".

[R518-520, 586-602]

This

proposed amendment was to clear up any confusion regarding the fact
that Buyers were seeking rescission as previously expressed in
their letter dated September 23, 1991 which demanded rescission of
the transaction, [R628] and as expressly pleaded at the outset of
this litigation in defense to the counterclaims of both Sellers and
Broker.

[R93 & 96]

The rescission claim was based on the same

factual and legal basis as those contained in the initial complaint
and, in fact, the factual allegations in the amended complaint were
identical to those in the initial complaint.
On September

8, 1997 the trial

[592-602]
court denied Buyers'

Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint "because it is untimely, is
prejudicial to the defendants, and [Buyers] have offered no excuse
for the delay in filing the same."
6.

[R1021-1024]

Buyers' Motion For New Trial.

On May 5, 1997, Buyers filed a "Motion for New Trial"
asking the court to reconsider its ruling granting Broker's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

[R712-714]

The Motion was based on the fact

that there were material issues of disputed fact which precluded
the entry of summary judgment and the trial court, as a matter of
law,

committed

judgment motion.

error

in

its

[R715-724]

ruling

granting

Broker's

summary

On September 8, 1997 the trial court

denied Buyers' Motion for New Trial

"on the grounds that this

Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of [Broker] is, and was,
correct and the Court made no error in law by granting [Broker's]
12

Motion for Summary Judgment."

[R1021-1025]

The court further

awarded Broker $14,229.33 in attorney's fees under its indemnity
counterclaim.

[R1021-1025]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The

trial

court

erred

in

granting

summary

judgment

against Buyers on their claims of fraud in the inducement and
negligent misrepresentation against Sellers and Broker.

There was

record evidence establishing each of the elements of these claims
against

Sellers

and

Broker.

More

particularly,

there

was

a

material representation made by Sellers, with knowledge and at the
insistence of the Broker (who failed to disclose the same), which
was relied upon by Buyers and which caused substantial damage to
Buyers. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been granted
on Buyers' claims against Sellers and Broker and the ruling should
be reversed.
The
judgment

trial

against

court

Buyers

further
on

their

erred

in

claims

granting

against

summary

Sellers

by

improperly ruling that Buyers failed to comply with a Default
provision
opportunity

which
to

required
cure

be

that

given.

notice
It was

of

a

error

default
as

and

the

an

Default

provision, which was obtained by fraud, was subject to rescission
and therefore unenforceable.

Moreover, even if enforceable the

provision was inapplicable as the "default" was the existence of
litigation

against

the

Seller

at

the

time

Transaction, and such default could not be cured.

of

the

Finally, Sellers

actually knew of the default and yet the litigation
13

Purchase

continued

against the business (and later also Buyer Ruf, Inc.) for more than
a year and a half after the Purchase Transaction Agreement was
entered,

and

eight

rescission detailing

months

after

Buyers1

the fraudulent

written

representation

notice

of

of Sellers.

Thus, the unenforceable Default provision could not provide a basis
for judgment in Sellers' favor as a matter of law or a matter of
fact and the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
The
judgment

trial

against

court

Buyers

further

on

erred

Sellers'

in

granting

counterclaim

summary

seeking

the

balance of the purchase price owing under the fraudulently induced
Purchase Transaction Agreement. The evidence establishing fraud in
the

inducement

committed

by

Sellers

and

Broker

subjects

the

Agreement to rescission and negates Buyers' obligation to pay the
balance under the Agreement (and entitles Buyers to be restored to
the position they occupied prior to the Agreement).

It was error,

therefore, for the court to grant summary judgment on Sellers'
counterclaim when the contract being enforced was induced by fraud.
The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment
against Buyers on Brokers' counterclaim for indemnification under
the fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement. Utah law,
as a matter of public policy, does not allow a party to contract
for immunity from its own fraud and any such provision is void.
Moreover, the provision is contained in the Purchase Transaction
Agreement

which

is

also

unenforceable

as

a

result

of

being

fraudulently induced as discussed in the preceding paragraph.

14

The

trial court's summary judgment in favor of Broker should therefore
be reversed.
Next, the trial court erred in refusing to allow Buyers
to amend their complaint to clear up any confusion regarding the
fact that Buyers were seeking rescission as previously expressed in
their letter to Sellers at the time the fraud was discovered, and
as asserted as affirmative defenses to the counterclaims of both
Sellers and Broker.

The amendment, which was proposed prior to

Sellers' summary judgment motion and prior to the court's ruling on
Broker's summary judgment motion, added no new factual issue or
legal issues;

therefore, the trial court's denial of Buyers'

motion for leave to amend was error and that decision should be
reversed.
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Buyers' Motion
for New Trial which sought reconsideration of the trial court's
summary judgment ruling in favor of Broker which was contrary to
law and which was based on an issue first raised by Broker in its
reply memorandum to which Buyers had no opportunity to respond.
Given the trial court's legal error and the existence of factual
issues precluding the entry of summary judgment, the trial court
should have granted Buyers' Motion for New Trial and reconsidered
its decision.

judgment
negligent

In

sum,

the

on

Buyers'

trial

claims

misrepresentation

court
for

erred

fraud

against

in

both

in

granting

the

summary

inducement

Sellers

and

and

Broker.

Moreover, given the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court
15

also erred in granting summary judgment against Buyers on the
counterclaims of Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on
the fraudulently induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial court's
rulings granting summary judgment in favor of Sellers and Broker
should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in dismissing Buyers' causes of
action for against Sellers and Broker for fraud in the inducement
and

negligent

misrepresentation

as

there

was

more

than

ample

evidence in the record to create genuine issues of fact on each
element of those claims. The trial court further erred in granting
summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of Sellers and
Broker seeking to enforce the written contract given that Buyers
had valid defenses to the contract which included fraud in the
inducement and the right to rescission.

Accordingly, the trial

court's orders entering summary judgment against Buyers should be
reversed and the case remanded.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
BUYERS' CLAIM OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT.
A.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING BUYERS'
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH SELLERS
AND BROKER.

Buyers' claim of fraud in the inducement asserted against
both Sellers and Broker was improperly dismissed by the trial court
as all elements of a fraud in the inducement claim were either

16

undisputed

or were

established

by

substantial

record

evidence

making the grant of summary judgment inappropriate in this case.
Summary

judgment

is

proper

only

if,

based

on

the

undisputed evidence, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

E.g. , Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934,

93 6 (Utah 1979) . Moreover, all evidence and inferences to be drawn
from the evidence are considered in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, the Buyers in this case, and the trial court's
ruling is accorded no deference.

E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.

State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989);

Neiderhauser Builders.

& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The Buyers must prove the following

six elements

to

establish their fraud in the inducement claim:
1.

That the defendant
statement; and

made

a

false

or

misleading

2.

That the defendant either knew the statement was
false or misleading, or that the defendant made it
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity;
and

3.

That the statement was of material fact; and

4.

That the defendant made the statement with the
intent that the plaintiff would rely on the false
or misleading representation; and

5.

That the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false
or misleading representation; and

6.

That the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of
relying on the false representation.

E.g., Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1990);
v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (1952).
17

Pace

The record evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated the
Buyers' ability to establish each of these elements against both
Sellers and Broker and summary judgment was improper.
1.

There
representation.

The Representation That There Were No Pending
Litigation Matters And The Failure To Disclose The
Existing Litigation Was False And The First Element
Was Satisfied.
can

be

no

dispute

about

the

Sellers'

false

The Sellers expressly represented in the Purchase

Transaction Agreement as follows:
The seller . . . represents to buyer . . .
that there are no known . . . litigation
proceedings against seller. . . .
This was a statement of a presently existing material fact which
was false because, as Sellers admitted in their pleadings before
the trial court, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was pending against
the Seller at the time the Purchase Transaction Agreement

was

executed. Additionally, Sellers admitted this false representation
in

their

Judgment:

Memorandum

in

support

of

their

Motion

for

Summary

"[Sellers] did not disclose to [Buyers] the pendency of

the Associated Factors Lawsuit."

[R742]

With respect to the Broker, the evidence before the trial
court further established that Appellee Johnson knew about the
Associated Factors Lawsuit pending against the Seller Icelandic and
told Broker about the litigation prior to the Purchase Transaction.
[R435-436, 742 at n. 1,

831, 1553]

Thereafter, the Broker not

only failed to disclose to Buyers the pendency of the Associated

18

Factors Lawsuit

but also persuaded the Sellers not to disclose

the pendency of the litigation.

[R742, 831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250,

1360-1363]
2.

Defendants Knew Their Representation That There Was
No Litigation Proceedings Against Seller Was False
And The Second Element Was Satisfied.

Both the Sellers and the Broker knew the representation
in the Purchase Transaction Agreement that there were no known
litigation proceedings against the Seller was false.

The Sellers

were parties to the litigation and admitted knowing the litigation
was pending at the time of the Purchase Transaction Agreement.
Further, the Broker had knowledge as the evidence established that
the Sellers disclosed the Associated Factors Lawsuit to the Broker
who promptly induced them not to disclose it to the buyers. [R742,
831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250, 13 60-13 63]
3.

The False Representation That There Were No Known
Litigation Proceedings Against Seller Was Material
And The Third Element Was Satisfied.

A fact is material if it is "something which a buyer or
seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of
some importance in determining whether to buy or sell."
Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974) .

S & F

Obviously

pending litigation against an entity one is purchasing is something

7

Under Utah law, a real estate agent owes a duty to
prospective purchasers to act honestly, ethically and competently,
and is answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty
to the public. E.g. , Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah
1980)(citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 802, 805
(1962)). Thus, real estate agents hired by vendors are liable to
purchasers
under
the
torts
of
fraud
and
negligent
misrepresentation. Id.
19

which an ordinary buyer would deem to be important and is, thus,
material.

Moreover,

Transaction Agreement

the

parties

that

the

stipulated

representation

in

the

Purchase

was material

by

expressly agreeing that "buyer may rely on the same to enter into
this transaction. . . . "

Thus, by definition the representation

was material.
The evidence before the trial court further established
the materiality of the misrepresentation by showing the following:
(1)

That the lack of outstanding litigation against Sellers was

extremely important to Buyers and that they would not have entered
into the Purchase Transaction Agreement or signed the corresponding
promissory notes if that warranty was not in the agreement [R866867 at mi 4-6

& 12] ;

(2)

That when the Buyers disclosed the

existing litigation against the business to Wesley Dudley, who was
financing the purchase and operation and was Buyers' only viable
source of financing, Wesley Dudley refused to advance any further
funds to finance the purchase or operation of the business and no
other financing was available [R866-867 at UK 9 & 10] ; (3) That the
Buyers' financing source had required, as a condition to financing
the purchase

and operation of the business, that there be no

litigation against the business [R855 at U 8 ] ; and (4) That upon
learning of the pending litigation against the business Buyers
could not obtain the additional $150,000 in funding which Buyers'
funding

source

was

ready,

willing

and

able

to

loan

had

the

contingency that there be no litigation against the Seller be
satisfied.

[R855 at HH 6-10]
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4.

Defendants'
Intent That Buyers Rely On The
Representation Was Stipulated And The Fourth
Element Was Satisfied.

The parties expressly agreed in the Purchase Transaction
Agreement that "BUYER may rely on the
into this transaction. . . . "

[representation] to enter

[R15-16]

Moreover, it was fully

expected Buyers would rely on the representation otherwise there
was no reason to withhold the information from Buyers.

Thus, it

was contemplated and even expressly intended that Buyers rely on
the representation that there was no litigation pending against
Seller at the time of the Purchase Transaction.
5.

Buyers
Reasonably
Relied
Upon
The
False
Representation And The Fifth Element Was Satisfied.

There is record evidence that the lack of outstanding
litigation against Sellers was extremely important to Buyers and
that they would not have entered into the Purchase Transaction
Agreement or signed the promissory notes if that warranty was not
in the agreement.

[E.g., R432-440, 866-867 at KU 4-6 & 12]

In

other words, the Buyers actually relied upon the representation.
The evidence and circumstances of this case further show
that the reliance was reasonable.

As discussed above, the parties

expressly stipulated that Buyers could rely on the representation
indicating that they contemplated that such reliance would occur,
and would be reasonable.

Moreover, representations that there are

no pending lawsuits are typically included in purchase contracts
and material information upon which a reasonable buyer would (and
should)

rely.

Finally, the fact that the Sellers and Broker

carefully concealed the litigation from the Buyers so the purchase
21

would take place erases any question that Buyers1 reliance was
reasonable.
6.

Buyers Suffered Damages As A Result Of The False
Representation And The Sixth And Final Element Was
Satisfied.b

Buyers were clearly damaged by the existence

of the

Associated Factors Lawsuit pending against the entity purchased by
Buyers.

The fundamental damage arises from the simple fact that an

entity embroiled in litigation is worth less than the entity Buyers
thought they were purchasing based on Defendants' representation,
namely

an

entity

not

involved

in

litigation.

Under

no

circumstances would the value of these two entities be the same
and, as a result, Buyers were damaged as they received an entity
worth less because of the litigation.
Buyers were further damaged as it is undisputed that, as
shown by the evidence, Buyers lost their funding source as a direct
and proximate result of this fraud. This evidence established that
Buyers' financing for the Purchase Transaction was contingent on
there being no pending litigation against the Seller and when it
came

to

light

that

there

was

pending

litigation

despite

the

representation to the contrary, the lender withdrew future funding.
[R5-7,

853-854, 864-870, 1167-1172]

8

Further, Buyers

incurred

This element of Buyers' fraud in the inducement claim is
not at issue with respect to the Broker's Motion for Summary
Judgment as the issue of damages was not raised by Broker until its
reply memorandum.
Accordingly, the damages element must be
presumed satisfied with respect to Broker's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
In any event, the evidence showing that Buyers were
damaged by the misrepresentation satisfies the damages element with
respect to both Broker and Sellers.
22

damage when, in September, 19 91, Buyer Ruf, Inc. was added as a
defendant

in the Associated Factors Lawsuit and had to retain

counsel to defend itself in that substantial litigation.9

[R437-

438, 830]
Clearly the foregoing demonstrates there was sufficient
evidence of damages to preclude summary judgment.

In order to

avoid summary judgment a party need not establish its damage claim
with precision, but need only demonstrate they can produce evidence
that would reasonably support a finding in their favor on this
issue.

Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah

1991);

Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991).

Thus,

the trial court's entry of summary judgment against Buyers on their
fraud in the inducement claim was error.
B.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
THE DEFAULT PROVISION IN THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION
AGREEMENT WAS NEITHER ENFORCEABLE NOR APPLICABLE.

In granting Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
trial court's decision centered on the Default provision set forth
as Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement. 10

The

3

The Associated Factors Lawsuit was substantial litigation
as Associated Factors was seeking to recover from Buyer Ruf, Inc.
the sum of $88,798.50 plus punitive damages, interest and
attorney's fees. [R474 & 478] The amount sought in the Associated
Factors Lawsuit exceeded the entire purchase price under the
Purchase Transaction Agreement. [R10-12]
10

That provision provides in pertinent part:
In the event any party to this Agreement defaults on any
term or provision incorporated herein, including any provision of
any Exhibit attached hereto, the nondefaulting party shall give the
defaulting party a written notice requiring that such default be
cured within thirty (30) days after receipt of said written
notice. . . . After such period, the nondefaulting parties may
23

trial court erred in basing its ruling on this Default provision
and finding that Buyers had no remedy against Sellers because they
did not provide written notice to Sellers and allow them to cure
the defect.

The court's ruling in this regard is flawed both

legally and factually.
1.

The Default Provision Is Not Enforceable As The
Agreement Was Induced By Fraud.

As a matter of law, a contract induced by a fraudulent
misrepresentation

of

existing

material

fact

rescission at the election of the defrauded party.

is

subject

to

E.g., American

Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1951);

Conder v.

A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm
the transaction and recover damages")(citing Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)); Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271
(Utah Ct. App. 1988)(same and noting the choice of remedy belongs
to defrauded party);
1979)(same).

Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 307-308 (Utah

The undisputed evidence establishes that Buyers were

fraudulently induced to enter into the Purchase Transaction and,
upon learning of the fraud, immediately issued a written notice of
rescission.
Additionally, the Sellers sought

(and the trial court

obliged) the enforcement and protection of a contractual provision

take the remedies set forth in this Agreement and any attachments
hereto. . . .[R15]
24

which was obtained by an affirmative and material misrepresentation
that no litigation existed.

A party to a contract cannot obtain a

contractual provision by fraud and then seek to hide behind the
protection of the provision when challenged with the fraud. As the
Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated:
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of
public policy.
A contract limitation on damages or
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or
proof of fraud.
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah
1993)(emphasis added).

Thus, as a matter of law the fraudulently

induced default provision is not a defense to Buyers' claims;
therefore,

the

court

erred

in relying

on

this

provision

and

granting summary judgment in favor of Sellers.
2.

The "Default" Could Not Be Cured And The Default
Provision Is Inapplicable.

Even if the law were ignored and the obligations and
limitations

set

enforceable,

forth

in

the Default

the

Default

provision

has

provision
no

were

application

somehow
as

"default" (i.e., the misrepresentation) could not be cured.

the
The

"default" was the existence of litigation against the Seller at the
time

of

the

Purchase

Transaction

representation to the contrary.
cured

--

despite

Sellers1

express

This default simply could not be

the litigation was in existence at the time of purchase.

Accordingly, the Default provision allowing the cure of a default
is not applicable as Sellers could not cure this defect brought
about by their blatant fraud.
25

3.

The Default Provision Does Not Provide Protection
For Sellers As They Had Notice Of The Default.

The purpose of the Default provision was to provide the
defaulting party with notice so they could effectively cure the
breach.

The undisputed evidence in this case establishes, however,

the Sellers had actual notice of the default at the time they
signed the Purchase Transaction Agreement.

Despite this actual

notice the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled for more than
a year and a half after the parties entered into the Purchase
Transaction Agreement.

Moreover, even if actual knowledge of the

default does not satisfy the technical requirement of the Default
provision, the undisputed evidence shows that on September 23, 1991
Buyers sent Sellers a written notice of rescission of the Purchase
Transaction identifying the outstanding litigation as the basis.
[R438, 628, 868]
requirement

of

Clearly this letter satisfied the written notice
the

Default

provision.

Despite

this

notice,

however, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled until June,
1992, more than eight (8) months after the notice.

Thus, even if

the Default provision were somehow enforceable and the default was
curable, the undisputed evidence shows that Sellers did not "cure"
the default within the thirty (3 0) period as required under the
Default

provision.

Thus,

the trial

court's grant

of

summary

judgment in favor of Sellers was reversible error on this basis as
well.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
BUYERS' CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
A.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING BUYERS'
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH
SELLERS AND BROKER.

Buyers' claim of negligent misrepresentation

asserted

against both Sellers and Broker was improperly dismissed by the
trial court as all elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim
were either undisputed or were established by substantial record
evidence making the grant of summary judgment inappropriate in this
case.
The Buyers must prove the following

six elements to

establish their negligent misrepresentation claim:
(1)

Defendant
had
transaction;

a

pecuniary

(2)

Defendant was in
material facts;

(3)

Defendant carelessly or negligently
representation concerning them;

(4)

Defendant expected the other party to rely and act
thereon;

(5)

Plaintiff reasonably relied thereon; and

(6)

Plaintiff suffered loss in that transaction.

a

superior

E .a. , Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title
302, 305

interest

in

the

position

to

know

a

false

made

Ins. Co., 666

P.2d

(Utah 1993).

The record evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated the
Buyers 1

ability to establish each of these elements against both

Sellers and Broker and summary judgment was improper.
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1.

Sellers And Broker Had A Pecuniary Interest In The
Purchase Transaction And The First Element Was
Satisfied.

There is no dispute that the Sellers were to receive the
purchase price and the Broker received a commission in excess of
$10,000 in connection with the Purchase Transaction Agreement.
Accordingly, both had a pecuniary interest in the transaction.
2.

Sellers And Broker Were In A Superior Position To
Know About The Litigation And The Second Element
Was Satisfied.

Sellers, as party to the Associated Factors Lawsuit, were
obviously in a superior position to know about the litigation.
Moreover, the Broker was not only in a better position to know
about that litigation but actually knew about the litigation and
persuaded Sellers not to disclose the litigation to Buyers.
3.

Sellers
And
Broker
Negligently
Made
False
Representation And The Third Element Was Satisfied.

The evidence before the trial court established that
Sellers

intentionally

represented

in

the

Purchase

Transaction

Agreement there was no pending litigation and Broker failed to
disclose and intentionally dissuaded Sellers from disclosing the
pending litigation to Buyers.

Given this intentional conduct, the

lesser standards of negligence and carelessness were met.
4.

Sellers and Broker Expected Buyers To Rely And Act
On The Representation And The Fourth Element Was
Satisfied.

This element is the same as the fourth element of Buyers'
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.4. at
p. 21, Sellers and Broker fully expected and intended Buyers to
rely on the representation.
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5.

Buyers Reasonably Relied On The Representation And
The Fifth Element Was Satisfied.

This element is the same as the fifth element of Buyers'
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.5 at
pp.

21-22,

Buyers

reasonably

relied

on

the

representation

in

entering into the Purchase Transaction.
6.

Buyers Suffered Loss As A Result Of The False
Representation And The Sixth And Final Element Was
Satisfied.

This element is the same as the sixth element of Buyers1
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.6. at
p. 22, Buyers suffered loss as a result of the representation.
Based on the foregoing, each element of Buyers' negligent
misrepresentation claim was supported by the record evidence and
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Buyers
on this claim.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
SELLERS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
BASED ON THE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PURCHASE
TRANSACTION AGREEMENT.
The trial court in granting summary judgment not only

dismissed

Buyers'

claims

but

it

also

summarily

enforced

the

Sellers' counterclaim for payment of the outstanding purchase price
of the business.

This was reversible error as the court enforced

a contract (and corresponding promissory notes) that were, based on
the undisputed evidence, induced by fraud.
As

a matter

of

law when

the

evidence

shows

that

a

contract has been induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation of
existing material fact except for which the party would not have
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entered the contract, the defendant can avoid liability under the
contract.

E.g., American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363

(Utah 1951);

Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d

634, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has
the option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the
purchase

price

or

to

affirm

the

transaction

and

recover

damages") (citing Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980));
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(same and
noting the choice of remedy belongs to the defrauded party and that
choice cannot be forced upon him);
307-308 (Utah 1979)(same).

Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 3 04,

The Utah Supreme Court's ruling is Zee

is pertinent to the issues currently before the Court.

In Zee the

Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment after trial to the
bench.
that

The trial court did not believe the defendant's testimony

the plaintiff's

fraud had induced

his entering

into the

contract. The Supreme Court found that defendant's testimony about
the

fraud,

being

uncontradicted,

required

judgment

against

plaintiff and in favor of defendant on the basis of rescission. As
this Court explained, "the effect of such remedy is to restore all
parties to the position they occupied immediately prior to the
fraud."

Perkins, 769 P.2d at 271.
In the instant

case

it is undisputed

that

Sellers'

representation that there was no pending litigation against the
business being purchased was material to Buyers and was false.
Moreover, upon learning they had been defrauded with regard to
litigation

against

the business, the Buyers promptly
30

provided

written notice to Sellers of Buyers1
Purchase Transaction Agreement.11

intention to rescind the

[R438, 628, 868]

Given those

facts it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment
against Buyers on the basis of the fraudulently induced contract.
The trial court had no power to weigh the credibility of
Buyers' claim of fraud in the inducement, but only to determine if
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that
the fraudulent representation had induced Buyers' signature on the
contract.

As

shown

above,

such

therefore, the trial court erred

evidence

in entering

clearly
summary

existed;
judgment

against Buyers on Sellers' counterclaim in light of Sellers' fraud.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
BROKERS' COUNTERCLAIM AND ENFORCING AN INDEMNITY
CLAUSE INDUCED BY FRAUD.
The trial court not only found that Broker could not be

held liable on the Buyers' fraud in the inducement and negligent
misrepresentation claims, but also summarily adjudged Buyers to be
liable

to

Brokers

because

of

the

inclusion

in

the

Purchase

1

In addition to the letter of rescission, at the outset of
this litigation in their Answer to the Sellers' counterclaim Buyers
expressly asserted rescission based on fraud:
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is
subject to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers
and Broker] as alleged in the Complaint which is
incorporated by this reference.
[R93]
While the rescission by Buyers in this case is clear, in the event
there is any question regarding rescission it is a question of fact
which would preclude the entry of summary judgment. E.q., Knudsen
Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 256, 240 P.2d 973, 975
(1952)(citations omitted).
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Transaction Agreement of an indemnity clause relieving the Broker
from representations or misrepresentations of the Sellers.

The

trial court erred, as a matter of law, in making this ruling as:
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity
which will protect a person against his own
fraud on the grounds of public policy.
A
contract limitation on damages or remedies is
valid only in the absence of allegations or
proof of fraud.
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah
1993) .
The

evidence

in

this

case

showed

that

the

Broker

fraudulently failed to disclose the pending litigation and caused
the

Sellers

pending.

to misrepresent

to Buyers

that

no

litigation

was

The Broker's failure to disclose the Associated Factors

Lawsuit gives rise to a fraud claim as, under Utah law, a real
estate agent owes a duty to prospective purchasers to act honestly,
ethically and competently, and is answerable at law for breaches of
his or her statutory duty to the public.
P.2d 1239, 1248

E.g. , Dugan v. Jones, 615

(Utah 1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d

279, 373 P.2d 802, 805 (1962)).

Thus, real estate agents hired by

vendors are liable to purchasers under the torts of fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.

Id.

Thus, as a matter of public

policy the indemnity provision relied on by the court in granting
Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment was unenforceable to protect
them from their own fraud.

E.g., Ong, 850 P.2d at 452.

Additionally, under the law a party who participates in
a misrepresentation is liable for the fraud though someone else
does the actual talking.

See Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382, 385
32.

(1962)

(party who makes misrepresentation

to third party with

intent it be communicated to plaintiff is liable for fraud)(citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 553)).

Thus it was error for the

court to find that the indemnification provision relieved Broker of
liability for their own fraud or for the Sellers' fraud which
Broker expressly encouraged and assisted.
Even

had

Broker

not

acted

fraudulently,

the

indemnification provision would not be enforceable as the Purchase
Transaction Agreement

is

subject

to rescission given Sellers'

blatant misrepresentations of material facts which induced Buyers
to enter into the transaction.

See supra § III at pp. 29-31. 12

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in enforcing
the indemnity provision

set forth in the Purchase

Transaction

Agreement as Buyers were fraudulently induced to enter into that
agreement.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION TO
AMEND TO ADD CLAIM OF RESCISSION.
Prior to the trial court's decision granting Broker's

Motion for Summary Judgment and prior to Sellers' summary judgment
12

Buyers, in addition to immediately sending written notice
of rescission of the Purchase Transaction Agreement to Sellers upon
learning of the fraudulent inducement, pleaded rescission as an
express defense to Broker's counterclaim. More particularly, in
their Answer to Broker's counterclaim Buyers' third defense stated:
Any indemnification agreement signed by [Buyers] is
subject to rescission given the conduct of [Sellers and
Broker] as alleged in the Complaint, which allegations
are hereby incorporated by reference as a further
affirmative defense.
[R96]
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motion, Buyers moved the trial court for leave to amend their
complaint

to add a claim

restitution".

for relief

[R518-520, 586-602]

entitled

"rescission

and

The rescission claim was based

on the very same factual and legal basis as those contained in the
initial complaint and, in fact, the factual allegations in the
amended complaint were identical to those in the initial complaint.
[592-602]

Buyers' proposed amendment was simply to clear up any

confusion regarding the fact that Buyers were seeking rescission as
previously expressed in their September 23, 1991 written notice
claiming rescission of the transaction,
pleaded

at

the

outset

of

this

[R628] and as expressly

litigation

counterclaims of both Sellers and Broker.

in

defense

to

the

[R93 & 96]

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs
amendment of pleadings and provides in pertinent part as follows:
. . . [A] party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
In

determining

consideration

whether

that

a

amendment

trial

judge

is
must

proper,
take

" [a]

into

primary

account

in

determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing
side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue
adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare."
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464

(Utah 1983).

Bekins Bar V

The trial court

erred in finding that there would be any prejudice to Broker or
Sellers if the proposed amendment were allowed.
of

the

amended

complaint

was

identical

to

The factual basis

that

in the

prior

complaint and, moreover, these legal issues were present since the
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inception of the case.

Accordingly, no additional discovery would

be necessary nor were any new issues raised.
The

granting

of

leave

to

amend

the

complaint

was

particularly appropriate here because both Broker and Sellers knew
that Buyers were seeking rescission of the agreement as Buyers had
previously sent a written notice claiming rescission and expressly
plead rescission as a defense to the counterclaims of Sellers and
Broker.

Accordingly, there simply is no basis upon which a court

could find that the proposed amendment was prejudicial.
Finally, the requested leave to amend should have been
granted because rescission was an appropriate remedy under the
circumstances.

As this Court has noted:

The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option
to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the
purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover
damages. The choice of remedy belongs to the victim of
the fraud, and a choice cannot be forced upon him.
The complaint filed by appellants pray for recission
[sic] of the second subordination agreement. They are
entitled to that remedy. The effect of such remedy is to
restore all parties to the position they occupied
immediately prior to the fraud.
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting
Dugan v. Jones, 612 P. 2d 1239, 1247

(Utah 1980) .

Accordingly,

rescission was an appropriate remedy and the trial court abused its
discretion

in

refusing

to

grant

Buyers

leave

to

amend

their

complaint to expressly add a claim of rescission.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
Following the trial court's decision to grant Broker's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Buyers filed a "Motion for New Trial"
35

asking the court to reconsider its summary judgment ruling.
714]

[R712-

The Motion was based on the fact there were material issues

of disputed fact which precluded the entry of summary judgment and
the trial court, as a matter of law, committed error in its ruling
granting Broker's summary judgment motion.

[R715-724]

Given the

trial court's improper legal conclusions and, more importantly, the
court's basing (at least in part) its summary judgment decision on
the issue of damages which was not raised by Broker until its reply
memorandum, the trial court should have reconsidered its ruling by
granting Buyers' Motion for New Trial.

At the very least, Buyers

were entitled to have the court consider the affidavits pertaining
to damages which were submitted in opposition to Sellers' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Sellers unlike Broker had raised the issue in
its opening memorandum).

Had the trial court considered those

affidavits which could not have been filed in response to Broker's
Motion for Summary Judgment initially as the issue was not raised,
it would

not

have granted

summary

judgment

finding Buyers failed to prove damages.

in Broker's

favor

Thus, the Motion for New

Trial should have been granted.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
Buyers'

claims

for

fraud

in

the

inducement

and

negligent

misrepresentation against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given
the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court also erred in
granting summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of
Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on the fraudulently
36

induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial, court's rulings granting
si immai: }r ji idgn tent: :i i i fa1! ? • ::»i: c f Se] 1 ers and Broker should be reversed
and the case remanded for further pi oceedings.
DATED this

day of June, 19 38,
ATF T T' ' i r i 11
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Said paragraphs 33 and 34 are hearsay, ana
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Defendant VR's Motion
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for Summary Judgment is based primarily on paragraph XX of the
contract between the parties.

Article XX says in pertinent part

that buyer is relying solely on buyer's inspection of the business
and the representations of seller, and not on VR Business Brokers
with regard to the prior operating history of the business, the
value of the assets being purchased, and all other material facts
of seller in making this offer.
that

the

broker

hasn't

The paragraph goes on to state

verified

and

will

not

verify

any

representations of seller and if any representation should be
untrue, buyer agrees to look solely to seller for relief, and to
indemnify broker (VR) and hold broker harmless in connection with
any losses or damages caused to buyer.
In its response, the plaintiff seems to ignore the foregoing
contractual provision, claiming that the plaintiff would not have
entered

into the

contract, but

for

negligent

and

fraudulent

misrepresentations by the seller and VR, and that therefore the
plaintiff is entitled to rescission and the terms of the contract
don't matter.
The plaintiffs' arguments have no merit for several reasons.
The

agreement was signed by all the parties.

The

plaintiff

testified in his deposition that he read the agreement thoroughly
and understood it.

Plaintiff, through paragraph XX, expressly

RUF, INC

ICELANDIC INVEST,

PAGE FOUR

I Ill 1UTE ENTRY

assumed the risks regarding representatioi: is or misrepresentations
of seller.

By this provision, plaintiff expressly relieved VR of

any legal duties arisina frcr fh>° d^rcribed conduct, i.e., seller's
representations or .. ..sreprese; . •.
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IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

< <
Case No, 93C9C55 7 8 CV"

ICELANDIC

INVESTMENTS, I N C .

BENCH DECISION. 9-4 97

Defendant,

11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Che 4th day
of August, 1997, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause

13

came on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN

14

HENRIOD, District Court, without a jury ir. the Salt

15

La.!«e County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

16
A P P E A R A N C E S :
For

;

For the Defendant:

;

23

the Plaintiff:

CAT by:

HCH DECISION, 8-4-97

1

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

(

Condensclt

JEFFREY L . S I L V E S T R I N I
A t t o r n e y a t Law
P H I L L I P W. DYER
L E S L I E W. SLA'JS.H
Attorney at Law

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

24
25

1 things that people don't know about that are not as
2 everybody thought they were when they put together
3 the list or representations at the start or a
4 contract?
5
I'd like Mr. Dyer to prepare orders on
6 the attorney fee motion, the motion to strike;
7 Mr. Slaugh to prepare ~ oh, and the motion for new
8 trial; Mr. Slaugh prepare the motion, the order on
9 the motion for summary judgment
: -)
I don't — oh, and the motion to amend is
; i denied. Four years is just way too long, and there
12 is prejudice and there is delay and there is no
13 excuse.
14
Mr. Slaugh.
15
MR. SLAUGH: On the promissory note, the
16 Johnsons would also have a claim for attomey fees on
17 that and I would submit it.
18
THE COURT: Submit your affidavit. And
that — this ruling does encompass the promissory
notes, so they are part of the judgment.
Thank you, Counsel.
MR. SILVESTRINI: Thank VOU.
MR. DYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Hearing adjourned.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

THE COURT: I am goine to go through the
motions, and I'm going to make some explanation when
I ' m finished. Witn regard to the motion for
attorney's fees, it is granted. I'm going to want an
affidavit that conforms with the Code of Judicial
Administration. There will certainly be an
opportunity to object to the specifics in the
affidavit.
The motion regarding the affidavits is
framed as far as the motion for new trial as respect
to VR's concerned.
Motion for new trial is denied.
Motion for sanctions was withdrawn.
And Icelandic's motion for summary
judgment is granted.

STATE Of UTAH

summary judgment and it is properly supported, the
burden on the responding party is a lot greater than
what Ruf or Dudleys have met in their response.
When I said wishy-washy, Mr. Silvestrini
— and that's really what I was talking about Mr. Slaugh talked about clear and convincing
evidence. It is clear to me from reading the

1
2
3
4
5
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
is
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

affidavits and the deposition that Mr. Dudley did not
rely on it. He likes to talk about reliance, but
he s got to bring to court admissible facts showing
that we've got a case to try. And that's where
Silatex (phonetic) and its progeny as affirmed by
Utah Supreme Court cases... And the fact that trie
Plaintiffs needed to bring to this Court to survive
these motions simply were never even proffered. And
that's absolutely true with the damage issue. That
was raised. That was before the Court. And there
hasn't been even an intimation regarding the kind of
specific types of damages that would have to be
raised again to survive this motion. Plaintiff has
simply tailed to make even a prima facie case of
fraudulent inducement. It takes more than just
evidence in the record.
I think the contract provision regarding
notice and cure is essential to any analysis of this
case, and it is also clear that the Plaintiff
completely ignored that provision. That provision
was there for exactly this kind of case. And I think
that cuts right to the core for the argument for
fraudulent inducement. Why is this provision in the
contract if the parties didn't acknowledge that there
are sometimes things misrepresented, omitted or even

)
J ss.

County of SALT LAKE' )

I, CARLTON S. WAY. CSR, do hereby certify
that I a m a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary
Public in and for the State of Utah;
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at
the time a i d place therein named and thereafter
reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided
transcription (CAT) under m y direction and control;
I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS MY HANTXAND SEAL this the 6th day of
August, 1997, --''

17
And I think this was explained very well
is by Mr. Slaugh. When a party makes a motion for
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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